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Abstract
Global governance is an oft-used concept the meaning of which is seldom clear. This paper 
start from a critique of the normative bias in much of the contemporary literature on global 
governance, which, it argues, obscures the class character of governance practices in a capitalist 
economy. After presenting a brief outline, in ﬁve foundational propositions, of an historical ma-
terialist approach to the phenomenon of global governance, the paper continues to historicize 
the phenomenon by analyzing both the historical continuities as well as the discontinuities that 
characterize global governance in the global economy. Next, the contemporary, i.e. early 21st 
century, variety of global governance is identiﬁed as neo-liberal global governance, that is to 
say as a form of governing the global political economy that is particularly suitable to furthering 
the underlying dynamic of the global economy in this era. This dynamic is identiﬁed as deepen-
ing commodiﬁcation and the pervasive penetration of the private proﬁt motive in all spheres of 
human existence. The evolving mode of regulating international business taxation serves as an 
empirical illustration of the historical meandering of the boundary between public and private 
governance at the global level. Finally, the paper situates its ﬁndings in the context of a broader 
theorization of neo-liberal global governance.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented in workshops at the Fernuniversitaet Hagen (Octo-
ber 2002), the University of Delaware (October 2002), at the Annual Conference of the Interna-
tional Studies Association in Portland (February 2003), and at the conference of the Central and 
East European International Studies Association in Budapest (June 2003). I thank all partici-
pants for their constructive comments. Special thanks are due to Alice Ba, Daniel Green, Matt 
Hoffmann and Andreas Noelke.
11. Introduction
Global governance has become a buzzword since the early 1990s (the publication of Rosenau 
and Czempiel 1992 was a watershed event). This is not the place to consider in detail the 
genesis of the concept or survey all the various meanings that the concept has acquired (for 
a good overview, see Behrens 2002). There are enduring deﬁnitional problems with both 
elements of the concept, i.e. with the meaning of globality and with the meaning of governance. 
Both are diffuse and elusive notions that defy precise deﬁnition exactly because they have 
been developed to capture diffuse and elusive phenomena. So, for the moment we should be 
satisﬁed with a loose approximation, where global roughly means ʻof planetary dimensionʼ, 
ʻworld-wideʼ, ʻglobe-spanning  ʼ(or at least the potentiality of those qualities), and governance 
has connotations with ʻregulationʼ, ʻco-ordinationʼ, and ʻauthoritative allocation of values  ʼ(all 
possibly encompassing ʻgovernment  ʼwithout however being limited to it).
The prototypical statement of the normative position is of course the deﬁnition of global 
governance given by the Commission on Global Governance:
“The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common 
affairs. It is a continuing process through which conﬂicting or diverse interests may be accommodated 
and co-operative action may be taken” (Commission on Global Governance, 1995, 2).
There are at least three key problems with this type of deﬁnition. First, it has a strong normative 
bias: it eliminates any possible connotation of domination and force. ʻGovernance  ʼbecomes a 
consensual process of accommodation between parties whose highest purpose is to reconcile 
possible conﬂict co-operatively. Secondly, this deﬁnition implies an actor-oriented approach. 
Such a disaggregating line of reasoning easily succumbs to the pitfalls of pluralism, i.e. of taking 
the plurality of actors, interests and partial structures (or ʻspheres of authorityʼ, e.g. Rosenau 
2002) as being the essence of things, and as being essentially undetermined, unbiased, ʻ neutralʼ, 
rather than seeing this plurality as set in a wider hierarchical conﬁguration of social power. 
Thirdly, it is a-historical in that it abstracts from the concrete historical conjuncture in which the 
concept has emerged. It thus implies that ʻ global governance  ʼis of all times. However, concepts 
only acquire their full meaning and complexity if the abstract contours, which may be true for 
all time, are colored in with the speciﬁcities of the historical epoch to which they are applied.1 
An abstract analytical deﬁnition of global governance might be arrived at by ﬁrst looking at the 
two component words of the concept, namely ʻgovernance  ʼand ʻglobalʼ. An abstract deﬁnition 
of ʻgovernance  ʼmay refer to, or incorporate, the following shorthand deﬁnitions found in some 
of the key sources in the literature: ʻorder plus intentionality  ʼ(Rosenau 1992, 5), or ʻorganizing 
collective action  ʼ(Prakash and Hart 1999, 2), or ʻinteractions in which public as well as private 
actors participate (Kooiman 2003, 4), or ʻauthoritative allocation of resources and exercise of 
control and co-ordination  ʼ(Rhodes 1996, 652). An abstract deﬁnition of ʻglobal  ʼwould have 
2to refer to the speciﬁc quality of the phenomenon under consideration, which is (potentially at 
least) ʻof planetary dimensionʼ, ʻworld-wide  ʼor ʻglobe-spanningʼ. Putting these two together 
we might tentatively deﬁne ʻglobal governance  ʼas follows:
Global governance refers to the authoritative allocation (by a variety of means) of values 
in policy areas that potentially affect the world as a whole and its component parts.
However analytical such a deﬁnition is, it does not resolve the third problem: it is still a-historical. 
In this paper, the aim is to outline a historically speciﬁc understanding of ʻglobal governanceʼ. 
Such an approach ought to address the three issues mentioned above: it must be an analytical 
approach rather than a primarily normative one; it must avoid the pitfalls of pluralism, and 
it must be grounded in a historical understanding. In this paper, these objectives are met, or 
at least that is the contention here, by situating the approach in the tradition of transnational 
historical materialism.2 Although it is not possible to outline in detail the foundations of this 
approach in the context of this paper, it is necessary to outline brieﬂy ﬁve key elements of this 
approach. Without these elements being explicitly highlighted at the outset our argument would 
lose its coherence. 
The ﬁrst point to make, picking up on the issue of making our concepts historically speciﬁc, 
is to stress the importance of the Marxian method of abstraction as outlined in the Grundrisse. 
In Marx  ʼown words, “... even the most abstract categories, despite their validity – precisely 
because of their abstractness – for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the speciﬁc character of this 
abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity 
only for and within these relations” (Marx 1973, 105). Thus, analytical concepts need to 
carefully separate abstract and invariant properties from historically speciﬁc ones. Concretely, 
the concept of ʻglobal governanceʼ, even if it became fashionable only in the 1990s, refers 
in an abstract sense to forms of regulation of social and economic interactions that we can 
also discern in earlier epochs. To understand why it is that the concept gained currency in the 
1990s, and to understand how the concrete forms of global governance of the current epoch are 
related to those earlier ones, the method of abstraction is uniquely useful. Without it, we will 
not be able to come to terms conceptually with the sequence of episodes3 that emerges from the 
consideration of these historical similarities and differences.
If we accept that the historical process produces breaks and transformations, we need a theory 
of social change. In historical materialism, this theory is grounded in the concept of dialectics. 
Fundamentally, this theory sees social reality as a dynamic totality and as a unity of opposites. 
Social development occurs through the unfolding of the contradictions that are in fact inherent in 
the social structures in question, and are not due to “exogenous factors”. In the words of Lucien 
Sève, “when the attempt to grasp the essence of things leads us invariably to contradiction, it is 
because contradiction is the essence of things” (Sève 1975, 676 [my translation, HO]);
3From this dialectical perspective Marx equated the history of mankind - and this dictum has 
come to live a life of its own - as the history of class struggle. This statement can give rise (and 
has done so) to intense debate. Here, what needs to be highlighted is the speciﬁc meaning of 
the concept of social class. From the standpoint of historical materialism, any analysis of the 
world we live in must be grounded in an understanding of the way in which human beings 
have organized the production and reproduction of their material life. This in fact is what Marx 
understood by ʻsocialʼ: the totality of all activity undertaken by human beings towards the (re-
)production of their existence.4 The centrality of class can be established on the basis of this 
understanding. Class should thus not be seen as a narrow and exclusive concept that relegates the 
“non-economic” to insigniﬁcance. On the contrary, class is a broad and inclusive concept that 
refers to the situation of human beings in the social relationships through which they structure 
the production and reproduction of their existence, and by which in turn they are constituted 
as social beings. These social relations of (re-) production are hierarchical and exploitative. 
They are furthermore guaranteed by the state: in the era of the dominance of capitalist social 
relations, they are guaranteed by the capitalist state. Although ʻ class  ʼas an organizing concept is 
a broad and inclusive one, it does nevertheless enable us to escape the weaknesses of pluralism 
by relating ʻpolitics  ʼto the underlying social power structures. 
When next we consider the translation of ʻclass  ʼ into politics, the adoption of Gramsci in 
transnational historical materialism is of crucial importance. In developed and complex capitalist 
societies, the political power of the ruling class does not rest exclusively or primarily on the control 
of the coercive apparatus of the state, but is diffused and situated in the myriad of institutions and 
relationships in civil society. This form of class rule, hegemony, is based on consent, backed up 
only in the last instance by state coercion. Ideological and moral elements play a crucial role in 
cementing the historic bloc5 and its hegemony in wider society (Gramsci 1971, 161, 168). Organic 
intellectuals of the dominant social groups formulate and disseminate these intellectual and moral 
ideas, transforming them into ʻuniversal  ʼones that bind subordinate groups into the existing social 
order (e.g. Gramsci 1971, 181-2). The concept of hegemony thus deﬁned is of key importance in 
discussions of ʻglobal governanceʼ, since hegemony refers to exactly the same apparent plurality 
of ʻ sites of governance  ʼthat is recognized in much of the global governance literature but explicitly 
links this plurality to an underlying class-based exploitative hierarchy.
The ﬁnal element of transnational historical materialism that is crucial to an understanding of the 
phenomenon of contemporary global governance is its emphasis on the transnational character 
of the capitalist system. What is meant here by transnational? Transnational processes, this 
paper maintains6, are constituted in a social space transcending national borders [i.e. their 
dynamics are not fundamentally deﬁned by the existence of national boundaries; in the words 
of Samuel Huntington (1991) they take place “in relative disregard of national borders”] and 
take place simultaneously in subnational, national and international arenas. The ʻnational  ʼ
4thus ceases to be the primary constitutive dimension of social relations: an overarching and 
increasingly dominant globe-spanning network of social relations encapsulates local, national, 
inter-national, and regional structures, dynamics and realities. In this sense, the traditional 
divide between ʻdomestic  ʼand ʻinternational  ʼpolitics is less and less helpful in the analysis of 
contemporary politics.
In the remainder of this paper, we will attempt to offer some building blocks for a historical 
materialist analysis of global governance. By way of empirical example, we will refer to the 
evolving ways in which the issue of business taxation has been dealt with at the global level, 
because this issue presents a perfect illustration of the dynamics and determining factors we 
wish to highlight. 
First (section 2) the paper presents a brief historical overview of the development of modes 
of global governance in the capitalist world economy. In section 3 the paper then turns to a 
theoretization of the contemporary mode of neo-liberal global governance, while ﬁnally in 
section 4 the paper attempts to draw out some more general theoretical implications of the 
analysis of neo-liberal governance.
2. Historical modes of global governance
Global governance, we might say in a shorthand deﬁnition, is governance in the age of 
globalization. Globalization has been deﬁned in thousand and one ways, mostly highlighting 
one or the other epiphenomenal aspect. However, at a more abstract level, ʻglobalization  ʼ is 
about commodiﬁcation, i.e. the process of transforming objects and activities into products and 
services that are sold on a market, thus into commodities The decades since the late 1970s have 
shown a sudden and unprecedented process of deepening commodiﬁcation, expressed in:
• the quantitative growth of existing forms of commodiﬁcation (e.g. the growth of international 
trade and ﬁnance);
• the expansion of the market into previously non-market sectors in the capitalist economies 
(e.g. privatization of state ﬁrms);
• the incorporation of new politico-geographic regions into the capitalist world market and 
its networks of commodiﬁed interaction (the demise of the planned socialist economies);
• The subordination to market forces of areas of human activity and existence that were 
hitherto not commodiﬁed in any real sense of the word at all (human reproduction, intellectual 
property, traditional medicine etc.). 
After decades of privatization and marketization, very few spheres of life on this planet remain 
shielded from the pursuit of private proﬁt. Ultimately, this process is driven by capitalʼs ceaseless 
search for proﬁt: its search for cheap sources of circulating capital and labor, for new markets, 
for differential proﬁt rates, for an escape from the internal contradictions of the capital – wage 
labor relation.
5Commodiﬁcation is not new to the world. In the past ﬁve hundred years we can identify 
three episodes of intensiﬁed market expansion and deepening commodiﬁcation, namely the 
episode of the original creation of the world market which we will call the period of mercantile 
globalization (1492 – 1648); the expansion of industrial capital and the rise of imperialism in the 
second half of the nineteenth century which we might call the era of laissez-faire globalization 
(1840s-1914); and ﬁnally the present episode of neo-liberal globalization characterized by the 
global expansion of transnational capital (1980s – present).7 The best way to look at these 
episodes is as distinct periods characterized by intensiﬁed change in an historical process of 
much longer duration, namely the process of capitalist development that has engulfed the globe 
since the ﬁfteenth century. Each of these waves of globalization has produced its own form of 
(liberal) ʻglobal governance  ʼ(e.g. Murphy 1994).
A starting point guiding our further analysis of these instances of global governance is the 
distinction between various fractions of capital and the particular hegemonic projects 
associated with such fractions. In volume 2 of Capital Marx considers the different functional 
forms that capital assumes in the circuits composing the overall reproductive circuit of capital: 
commodity capital, money capital, and productive capital. In terms of concrete ﬁrms, merchant 
houses, ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and industry approximate these fractions.8 Underlying this fractionation 
is the even more fundamental distinction between ﬁxed capital and circulating capital (loosely 
identiﬁable with productive capital and money capital respectively) (cf. Shortall 1986). In turn, 
this process of fractionation of capital shapes class fractions which share common orientations, 
interest deﬁnitions, and collective experiences. These provide ingredients for a coalition of interests 
aspiring to represent the ʻgeneral interest  ʼof a class, supported by a broader social hegemony 
incorporating subordinate classes and social forces. In modern politics in capitalist societies, 
private and fractional interests tend to coagulate around
ʻ(….) largely implicit, but no less deﬁnite, common programs, or comprehensive concepts of control. 
Such concepts are political formulas that lend cohesion and cogency to the rule of particular classes 
and fractions of classes by translating idealized class and fractional viewpoints into a strategic 
orientation for society as a whole. Their capacity to be presented as a necessary and/or legitimate 
expression of the general interest derives from their basis in pivotal positions in the economy, which 
at particular junctures in the process of capital accumulation and social development acquire a 
relevance beyond this mere “function”.  ʼ(Van der Pijl 1989, 7-8)
These concepts of control are constituted around two prototypes, the money capital concept and 
the productive capital concept (reﬂecting the distinction between ﬁxed and circulating capital). 
Usually those groups assert themselves most effectively whose speciﬁc group interests at a given 
juncture most closely correspond with the prevailing objective state of capital accumulation and 
class struggle (van der Pijl 1984, 33-4). 
6We must now see how the changing balance of forces between fractions of capital, the related 
succession of correspondingly dominant comprehensive concepts of control, and the scale of 
operation of these various fractions of capital (in other words, the spatial coordinates of their 
speciﬁc reproductive cycles) interact to deﬁne the main characteristics of global capitalism 
in speciﬁc historical episodes. While money capital, abstractly as total capital, concretely as 
ʻhigh ﬁnanceʼ, has operated on a cosmopolitan plane ever since the Middle Ages, production 
under its inﬂuence has operated on an only gradually widening scale. When the typical, or 
ʻparadigmaticʼ, scale of operation of industry coincided with the national state in the most 
important countries, a historically unique situation developed. Internationally operating money 
capital was subordinated to nationally operating productive capital, a development that reached 
its zenith in the 1930s and was only phased out slowly over the period 1945-1975.
 
[See diagram 1 for a schematic representation of the paradigmatic 
scales of operation of money and productive capital].
Prior to this stage of the mobilization of the ʻprinciple of social protection  ʼin the context of 
the national state, industry operated on a subnational scale. Its output was marketed on a world 
market dominated by British industry, commerce and transport to such an extent that notions of 
universal free trade and harmony developed in Britain were also embraced in countries whose 
capacity to compete was undermined by unmitigated exposure. The era of the Pax Britannica 
spawned a comprehensive concept of control expressing and idealizing this state of affairs. 
Normalcy and the ʻ general interest  ʼwere predominantly deﬁned therefore in terms of an abstract 
and cosmopolitan money capital perspective. The hegemonic concept of this era was liberal 
internationalism. 
7Diagram 1. Paradigmatic Scales of Operation of Capital and Hegemonic Concepts of 
  Control in Modern Capitalism
            paradigmatic scale of operation#      hegemonic
         money capital   productive capital      concept
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1820s-70s   cosmopolitan*     local           
         liberal internationalism
1870s-1914  cosmopolitan*     national        
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1920s      cosmopolitan   national*                                    
     state monopolism
& 30s     national    national*
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1950s     national    Atlantic*      
         corporate liberalism
60s&70s   cosmopolitan  Atlantic*     
  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980s     cosmopolitan*  global &    neo-liberalism 
& 1990s     regional
*  The asterixes mark the prevailing perspective (money or productive) in the hegemonic 
concept of 
 control.
#  Although both ʻcosmopolitan  ʼ and ʻglobal  ʼ indicate that the paradigmatic scale of 
operation encompasses the whole world, the difference is that money capital can 
disengage itself almost completely from any form of nation-state control, whereas 
productive capital, however globally operative, is always, at any particular moment in 
time, bound to speciﬁc physical/ geographical locations, and therefore subject to state 
control.
Source: Overbeek & Van der Pijl 1993, p. 7.
To illustrate the emerging mode of liberal global governance in this era, let us consider brieﬂy 
the emergence of the transnational regulation of business taxation. During the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries states were confronted for the ﬁrst time with the impact of increased capital 
mobility on their tax systems. On the one hand, states began to introduce various schemes 
of direct taxation to ﬁnance their growing expenditures, while on the other hand capital 
internationalized rapidly (ﬁnance in particular, but productive capital as well). This brought 
to the fore the problem of double taxation, i.e. the same income being taxed by the country 
of residence as well as by the host country (where the income was being generated). Business 
8pressure, through the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, put the issue on the agenda 
of the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations. In the early 1920s the Fiscal Committee 
commissioned a report, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, to propose action (Picciotto 
1991, 54-55). The report considered two alternative ways of approaching the problem, formula 
apportionment and the arm sʼ length principle. 
Formula apportionment entails the shared taxation of the total proﬁts of a corporation, with a 
formula stipulating the respective shares for home and host (or capital exporting and capital 
importing) countries  ʼgovernments. This approach was rejected in the report because it posed 
too many politically sensitive issues and would require a multilateral international agreement. 
The armʼs length principle, which was the reportʼs preferred solution, means that the activities 
by subsidiaries of corporations are considered essentially as separate businesses to be taxed by 
the host government. This principle thus requires negotiations between corporate ofﬁcials and 
host government bureaucrats, which in many cases reinforces the already skewed balance of 
forces between weak governments and strong global corporations. The armʼs length principle 
would eventually become the basis for the post-World War II international corporate taxation 
regime (Picciotto 1991, 55).
In the period from the First World War to the 1950s the productive capital perspective (Polanyiʼs 
principle of social protection, see Polanyi 1957) was dominant at the national level; in this 
era, the hegemonic concept of control was that of state monopolism. Money capital was still 
principally engaged in international operations, but the crisis of the 1930s led to its curtailment 
by state authorities. Given the near collapse of the global economy, it is no surprise that the 
proposals of the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations for the regulation of international 
business taxation were put on hold during this period. Regulation was primarily undertaken at 
the national level, in any case much more so than either before (1930) or after (1945).
Gradually, and deﬁnitely following the Second World War, (US) industry expanded on an 
Atlantic plane, albeit in a highly regulated setting. A welfare state concept, the highest form of 
Polanyiʼs principle of social protection constructed around the productive capital viewpoint, 
combined aspects of expanding production with a measure of re-liberalization in the international 
sphere. Liberalization however was mostly restricted to trade in industrial products. Trade in 
agricultural products, and more importantly in services, as well as ﬁnancial ﬂows, were and 
remained heavily regulated and restricted. In theoretical terms, we may conclude that during 
this episode the hegemony of the productive capital view was overwhelming and subordinated 
the money capital perspective. The comprehensive concept deﬁning the new normalcy and 
general interest at this stage was corporate liberalism. The new system of international business 
taxation accompanying corporate liberalism was eventually initiated with the wartime tax treaty 
concluded between the United States and the United Kingdom. This became the model after 
9which a rapidly expanding network of bilateral taxation treaties was erected, primarily between 
and among the US, the UK, the English-speaking Commonwealth countries, and the major West 
European states. The co-ordination of this system, based on intergovernmental bilateralism 
mixed with the informal involvement of corporate lobby groups, was eventually entrusted not to 
a United Nations organ, but to the Fiscal Committee of the OECD (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, 
96-97). The structure of this system in many ways resembles and complements the structures of 
the Lockean heartland created in the second part of the nineteenth century in the form of the old 
Commonwealth and its symbiosis with the United States (cf. Van der Pijl 1989, 1998). The new 
system functioned without great difﬁculties in the era of ʻembedded liberalism  ʼ(Ruggie 1998, 
62-84) as corporate liberalism has also become known..
In the crisis of the 1970s, ﬁnally, a struggle ensued which resulted in the triumph of neo-
liberalism. Neo-liberalism reaches back to the abstract and cosmopolitan money capital 
perspective so prominent in liberal internationalism, but industry has meanwhile outgrown its 
national conﬁnes. The paradigmatic scale of operation of industrial capital today is global, at 
least in tendency. At the same time we witness a relative disintegration of the national framework 
into multiple local and regional frameworks. We now turn to a closer look at the emergence of 
this latest mode of global governance.
3. Neo-liberal global governance
In this section, we turn to an analysis of the conditions under which the global governance 
concept has risen to such ubiquitous popularity, and which social forces have ʻhijacked  ʼ the 
notion and deﬁned its politicized (neo-liberal) meaning. First we will take a brief look at the 
rise of neo-liberalism to hegemony in the 1970s and 1980s, if not globally then at least within 
the developed capitalist parts of the world, i.e. roughly speaking in the OECD world. Second, 
in order to ground our understanding of neo-liberal global governance a bit more theoretically, 
we look at some of the relevant concepts proposed by Robert Cox and Stephen Gill. Finally, 
we will again illustrate the main points through a brief exposé on the development of the global 
regime for business taxation in this period.
To trace the emergence of neo-liberalism and the latest globalization wave, we must go back to the 
1970s (see also Overbeek and van der Pijl 1993 on this). With the crises in the 1970s of Fordism 
and the Keynesian welfare state as the catalysts, and with the rise of new technologies in transport, 
communication and information as enabling factors, a process of rapid internationalization of 
ﬁnancial and productive capital was set in motion. This internationalization drive was pushed 
forward by successive state-led liberalization and deregulation offensives explicitly aimed at 
subordinating the global economy as well as the various national economies to the discipline of 
“the markets”. The comprehensive concept of control that emerged as a response to this crisis has 
become known as neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism elevates identiﬁable fractional interests to the 
10
level of a claimed ʻ general  ʼinterest: it expresses the outlook of transnational circulating capital, 
primarily international money capital but also an increasing proportion of the capital embodied 
by transnational industrial corporations as these became more and more dominated internally 
by ﬁnancial managers rather than production engineers. The key to understanding the ʻsolution  ʼ
to the crisis offered by neo-liberalism lies in the role that money capital as capital-in-general 
plays in the restructuring of both the spatial and technical aspects of production and the social 
relations of production, in order to adjust production to consumption, and restore proﬁtability 
by raising the rate of exploitation and the mass of surplus value. Capital had to be liberated from 
all unnecessary constraints on its mobility before this restructuring could be undertaken. This 
ʻgeneral  ʼcapitalist interest was reasserted through the adoption of monetarism. Monetarism holds 
that by making money scarce, inﬂation can be combated effectively and sound micro-economic 
reasoning can be forced upon the state and society as a whole. Although unpopular since the 
1920s, it had always continued to attract the support of some economists, journalists, and 
government ofﬁcials, particularly in the USA and Britain. After 1945, it was propagated by a 
number of private transnational groups such as the Mont Pèlerin Society (inspired by Friedrich 
Hayek and Milton Friedman), and as the crisis of the 1970s deepened, its voice grew louder and 
succeeded in winning over more and more inﬂuential bodies. The monetarists scored important 
victories in Chile (with the rise to prominence of the ʻChicago boys  ʼin 1975) and Britain (with 
Margaret Thatcherʼs emergence as the countryʼs leader in 1979). The decisive turning point 
came when, also in 1979, Paul Volcker was appointed chairman of the US Federal Reserve 
Board and initiated a strict monetarist regime that drove up real interest rates in the US and 
the world economy. This rise of monetarism resulted in a rapid shift in the class structure 
away from the corporate-liberal pattern to an individualist one in which the interests of the 
rentier and the ʻventure capitalist  ʼwere predominant. Rentier incomes rose, stock ownership 
was popularized through privatization, and bank proﬁts increased relative to those of industry. 
Investment banking and ﬁnancial services became the hottest industries. In reaction to the 
tenets of the disintegrating corporate-liberal or Keynesian consensus of the years 1945-1971, 
neo-liberalism extolled the virtues of the free market and the withdrawal of the state from 
the management of the economy. Its core concepts and precepts (liberalization, privatization, 
deregulation and internationalization) as well as its new individualist ethic gradually became 
hegemonic and eclipsed traditional Social Democracy. The victory of neo-liberalism was even 
interpreted as the “End of the Social-Democratic Century” (Dahrendorf 1990). This process 
is not as straightforward as it might seem from this account. In fact, there is a complex and 
dialectical relationship between neo-liberalism as process and neo-liberalism as project. 
Certainly, there is such a thing as a neo-liberal project that is consciously and purposefully 
pushed by its protagonists (organic intellectuals, entrepreneurs and politicians, organizational 
representatives etc.). This is where the agency of individuals such as Milton Friedman and 
organizations such as the Mont Pèlerin Society were crucial during the 1970s and 1980s, and this 
is where agents such as the World Economic Forum and others carried forward the neo-liberal 
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onslaught in the 1990s (cf. van der Pijl 1998). But of course, as critics of this approach will 
quickly point out, these programmes have never been simply put into practice lock, stock and 
barrel. A hegemonic project or comprehensive concept of control is shaped, and continuously 
reshaped, in a process of struggle, compromise and re-adjustment, resulting in “a succession of 
negotiated settlements, of concessions to the rigidities and dynamics of structures as well as the 
political possibilities of the moment.” (Drainville 1994, 116). Eventually we have seen a form 
of consolidation of neo-liberalism, internationally as well as within the advanced industrial 
countries. Any notion of an alternative to the global rule of capital became utterly ʻunrealistic  ʼ
and discredited and neo-liberal reforms were ʻlocked-in  ʼand ʻnormalizedʼ. The signiﬁcance of 
the demise of real socialism in this respect cannot be overstated (Mishra 1999, 111-112): until 
its deﬁnitive discomﬁture and disintegration the mere existence of an alternative economic and 
social system provided an incentive for the capitalist class in the West to accommodate the 
working class. With the demise of really existing socialism this incentive lost its force, opening 
up political space for a more radical overhaul of the structures of corporate-liberalism (see also 
Overbeek 2003). 
In terms of theoretically grasping the new structure of the global system and the nature of 
neo-liberal global governance, a convenient and inspiring reference point is the concept of the 
ʻinternationalization of the state  ʼ(Cox 1996, 107). In this article Cox analyzed the mechanisms 
for maintaining hegemony in the era of Pax Americana and argued that the internationalization 
of the state is associated with the expansion of international production. He later deﬁned it as 
the process through which “the nation state becomes part of a larger and more complex political 
structure that is the counterpart to international production” (Cox 1987, 253). The process can 
be expressed in three points:
• A process of interstate consensus formation regarding the needs or requirements of the 
world economy that takes place within a common ideological framework;
• Participation in this consensus formation is hierarchically structured;
• The internal structures of states are adjusted so that each can best transform the global 
consensus into national policy and practice, with ʻ state structure  ʼboth referring to the machinery 
of government and to the historic bloc (the alignment of dominant and acquiescent social groups) 
on which the state rests. (Cox 1987, 254). 
It is, says Cox, “increasingly pertinent to think in terms of a global class structure alongside or 
superimposed upon national class structures” (Cox 1996, 111; emphasis added). At the apex of 
this emerging global class structure is the “transnational managerial class” situated in the higher 
echelons of the Trilateral Commission, the World Bank and IMF, and the OECD. The members 
develop a common framework of thought and guidelines for policies that are disseminated 
through the process of the internationalization of the state (Cox 1996, 111; see also Sklair 
2001 for a recent study). In peripheral areas the ﬁnancial power exercised by the IMF and 
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the World Bank, which was tremendously intensiﬁed after the debt crisis of the 1980s, often 
serves to impose or restore the discipline of the market where it is lacking or weakening. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transformation of the global state system have 
eliminated many obstacles to the further expansion of markets through the enhanced global 
reach of transnational capital. The priorities of economic and social policies worldwide have 
been recast to reﬂect the new dominance of investors. International institutions (such as OECD, 
IMF, World Bank and WTO) and groupings of dominant states (G7) are engaged in the legal 
and political reproduction of this disciplinary neo-liberalism and ensure through a variety of 
regulatory, surveillance and policing mechanisms that neo-liberal reforms are locked in (cf. Gill 
1995; the disciplinary dimensions of neo-liberal global governance are also central to Dufﬁeldʼs 
recent study, Dufﬁeld 2001). In the core areas of the world economy this discipline appears in 
the shape of ʻvoluntary  ʼprograms of competitive deregulation and austerity that are codiﬁed in 
such arrangements as the EMU stability pact or the WTO liberalization regime. Stephen Gill 
refers to the erosion of democratic control implied in this process as New Constitutionalism, 
“... the move towards construction of legal or constitutional devices to remove or insulate 
substantially the new economic institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability” 
(Gill 1992, 165).
Again, developments in the area of global business taxation may serve as illustration. In the 1970s 
the ﬁrst cracks began to appear in the international ﬁscal system. The spread of multinational 
corporations posed increasing problems for national ﬁscal authorities (cf. Murray 1975). These 
difﬁculties were intensiﬁed by the growing importance of tax havens. Tax havens in a sense 
emerged in the 1920s as a consequence of some states, primarily Switzerland, not following in 
the footsteps of the other industrial countries in joining the emerging international ﬁscal order 
(cf. Palan & Abbott 1996, Palan 1998, Picciotto 1999). At that time, ʻtax havens  ʼreally were 
anachronistic phenomena. However, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and 
the relaxation of capital controls new tax havens and other ʻoff-shore ﬁnancial centers  ʼwere 
created, primarily in the Caribbean but in Europe as well (Jersey, Gibraltar, and Luxembourg). 
As tariffs on imports fell under the impact of successive GATT trade liberalizations, the 
incentives to compete through taxes increased further (Tanzi 1996). Under these changing 
conditions being a ʻtax haven  ʼbecame a deliberate strategy for state-like entities and statelets 
whose survival in the inter-state system is now reproduced and expanded by interested parties 
and indeed by the state system itself. The logic of international tax competition threatened 
to destabilize the ʻorderly  ʼconduct of transnational business (for instance by facilitating the 
increasing penetration of the international ﬁnancial system by organized transnational crime) 
and would indeed ultimately lead to the complete elimination of corporate taxation. In response, 
governments in the OECD area agreed that something would have to be done to eradicate the 
worst abuses and protect the legitimacy of the tax system. Both in the EU and in the OECD 
this resulted in discussions over a ʻvoluntary  ʼcode of conduct for governments. The OECD 
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published a report on the issue in 1998 (OECD 1998), and held a conference in December 
1998 to consider measures to curb ʻharmful tax competition  ʼin the form of a voluntary code 
of conduct (cf. Nettinga 1999, and Weiner and Ault 1998). In its follow-up report (OECD 
2000) the OECD made a beginning with identifying ʻ uncooperative  ʼtax havens and with listing 
possible countermeasures. In itself, this line of action is not very impressive: voluntary codes of 
conduct in the regulation of global business are generally characterized by ineffectiveness and 
mostly serve a legitimating function (van der Pijl 1993). They do illustrate however that neo-
liberal de-regulation leads to re-regulation of a speciﬁc kind, involving a new mix of public, 
semi-public and private actors and institutions that are brought together in national, regional 
and global forums and networks (Picciotto 1999, 64-6; see also Cerny 1991). This system tends 
to “legitimise the continued existence of the offshore system for avoidance which has not been 
stigmatised, especially tax. However, tax avoidance depends on facilities such as corporate 
and banking secrecy, which undermine regulatory cooperation on other matters” (Picciotto 
1999, 70). Such policy convergence as does take place within the OECD area comes about 
primarily through emulation rather than international agreement. It continues to be based on the 
armʼs length principle that ignores the integrated nature of transnational corporations and thus 
continues to place them in a privileged position vis-à-vis the tax authorities. 
4. Some ﬁnal theoretical considerations
The concept of global governance has acquired its popularity in the years of intensifying 
globalization since the early 1980s. The previous sections have argued that our understanding 
of this concept must be historicized and must be made ʻ class sensitiveʼ. Our shorthand deﬁnition 
of global governance (governance in the age of globalization) must therefore be expanded by 
reference to a number of historically speciﬁc characteristics to make it applicable to an analysis 
of the contemporary wave of globalization. 
Governance in the contemporary global political economy is increasingly characterized by 
informalization and transnationalization or, put differently, by the creation of additional formal 
and informal structures of authority and sovereignty besides and beyond the state. Institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization have achieved a 
considerable degree of autonomy from the national governments that nominally control their 
executives, while more informal organizations such as the G-7 or the World Economic Forum 
play a crucial role in formulating longer-term strategic policy orientations. What is also striking  is 
the multiplicity of governance sites and modes involving any combination of intergovernmental 
and trans-governmental regulation, ʻpublic-private  ʼregimes, and forms of private authority and 
self-regulation.9 The emergence of these new structures, often combining public and private 
forces, has led Robert Cox to his famous phrase of a global nébuleuse (Cox 1996, 298). 
The role of international organizations such as the OECD, the IMF and others in providing 
direction to this nébuleuse is noteworthy. These organizations more frequently than not have 
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no formal regulatory powers, they cannot impose their will on states (not on non-members, but 
neither on their own member states), and they have few or no sanctioning powers. Nevertheless 
their inﬂuence and prestige are enormous and most governments in the world are willing, 
albeit reluctantly, to comply with their ʻrecommendationsʼ. Their primary role often is that 
of progenitor of ideas, which they successfully spread through bringing together senior civil 
servants, business executives, and technical specialists in working groups and conferences that 
give real substance to the concept of epistemic community (Strange 1996, 62). The role of 
civil servants of international organizations in this context is also striking. For instance, the 
role of top ofﬁcials in the IMFʼs Fiscal Affairs Department (Vito Tanzi, Howard Zee) in the 
campaign in favor of the establishment of an International Tax Organization to regulate global 
tax competition and look after the states  ʼﬁscal soundness is a case in point. It indeed provides 
an eloquent illustration of the role that Kees van der Pijl sees the cadre class (the social stratum 
of managers both in the private business world and in public service) playing:
“The cadres are oriented, by deﬁnition, to sustaining social cohesion and the integrity of the social [ 
… ] substratum exploited by capital. Even if, as in neo-liberalism, the dominant orientation is towards 
deepening the discipline of capital, the function of providing cohesion cannot be abandoned.” (Van 
der Pijl 1998, 163).
Elsewhere (see Pellerin and Overbeek 2001) we have attempted to clarify in some detail what 
functions these informal and quasi-formal forums (or ʻprocessesʼ) perform. It would seem that 
these include at least the following:
• Communication: they serve as channels for communication between policy-makers, experts, 
and interested third parties. This is especially important for those countries (e.g. several of 
the CIS countries) whose ofﬁcials have little or no direct contact with their counterparts in 
the OECD world;
• Socialization: they further serve to socialize the ofﬁcials, experts and policy-makers of 
peripheral states into the existing global epistemic communities; 
• Institutionalization: they help to secure the desired (neo-liberal) policy reforms within the 
(semi-) peripheral states (this process is called locking in);
• Integration: in the case of the relationship between the OECD and the European Union 
on the one hand and a number of the Central and East European states on the other, these 
forums are clearly complementary to the ongoing accession process and prepare the ground 
for ultimate full membership of the EU and the wider OECD world.
Contemporary global governance is not just process; it is also substance. It is neo-liberal global 
governance. Its ʻsocial purpose  ʼ(Ruggie 1998, 62-72) is dictated by the imperatives of capital 
accumulation on a world scale. This social purpose transpired clearly in the example of the 
governance of international business taxation. As we have seen, the international system of tax 
regulation, which emerged in the 1920s and served its purpose relatively well until the 1970s, 
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has in recent decades come under increasing competitive pressures. The existing system heavily 
privileges mobile (especially ﬁnancial) capital and allows transnational capital to circumvent or 
evade taxation practically without sanction. Such regulation as does exist is based on voluntary 
forms of self-regulation, while no formal international organization exists with regulatory powers 
to impose a decent tax ethic on capital. The requirements of global freedom of movement for 
capital dictate the shape and form of global governance in the tax sphere, in which various inter-
governmental and international non-governmental organizations play key roles.
In sum: our explorations have shown that neo-liberal global governance in large part functions 
to make market reforms irreversible through inscribing them into, and anchoring them deeply 
in, the legal systems of most countries. Global governance constitutionalizes private property 
rights, guarantees the unhindered mobility of capital, and controls and subordinates potentially 
rebellious social forces and states. The concept of global governance thus has suffered the 
same fate of other initially progressive normative concepts such as ʻ new international economic 
order  ʼor ʻsustainable developmentʼ: it has been hijacked by social forces that have emptied it 
of its counter-hegemonic content and redeﬁned it in such a way that the concept in fact supports 
the further consolidation of the world-wide rule of capital.
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Notes
1 “The principle of historical speciﬁcity”, wrote C. Wright Mills (commenting on Marx), “leads us to see that 
conceptions and categories are not eternal, but are relative to the epoch which they concern” (Mills 1977, 39).
2 A more extended account of transnational historical materialism can be found in Overbeek (2000). See also Gill 
(1993) and Rupert and Smith (2002). The term was originally coined by Gill and Law (1988).
3 I try to avoid using terms like ʻcyclesʼ, ʻstages  ʼor ʻphases  ʼwhich are all tainted with connotations leading us 
into debates that are not pertinent for our present purposes. For an excellent collection of essays precisely on these 
questions see Albritton et al., 2001.
4 This is brought out very clearly in The German Ideology: “The ﬁrst presupposition of all human history is of 
course the existence of living human individuals. [...] [Human beings] begin to distinguish themselves from the 
animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of existence. [...] The creation of life, current life through 
labor and new life through procreation, immediately reveals itself as a social relation - social in the sense that it 
implies the collaboration of various people, irrespective of the conditions, the manner and the objective.” (Marx 
and Engels, 1974, 21, 30; my translation, HO). 
5 In Cox sʼ words, ʻhistoric bloc  ʼrefers to ʻa conﬁguration of social forces upon which state power rests  ʼ(Cox 1987, 
105; also 6, 409 n. 10).
6 This interpretation was developed at somewhat greater length in a recent article (see Overbeek 2003).
7 This periodization is derived from various other periodizations in the literature, such as those by Mandel in his 
Late Capitalism (1975) or by Zürn (1995), which are roughly similar though certainly not the same. 
8 Cf. Van der Pijl 1984, 1-20; ibidem 1998, 49-63; also Overbeek 1990, 23-29, 176-181.
9 For recent overviews of the role of private authority in global governance see Cutler et al. 1999, Hall and 
Biersteker 2002, and Higgott et al. 2000.
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